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SCRUTINIZING ANTICOMPETITIVE STATE REGULATIONS
THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTITRUST LENSES
DANIEL A. CRANE*
ABSTRACT
State and local regulations that anticompetitively favor certain
producers to the detriment of consumers are a pervasive problem in
our economy. Their existence is explicable by a variety of structural
features—including asymmetry between consumer and producer
interests, cost externalization, and institutional and political factors
entrenching incumbent technologies. Formulating legal tools to
combat such economic parochialism is challenging in the post-
Lochner world, where any move toward heightened judicial review
of economic regulation poses the perceived threat of a return to
economic substantive due process. This Article considers and
compares two potential tools for reviewing such regulations—a
constitutional principle against anticompetitive parochialism and
diminished state action immunity from antitrust law in cases
brought by the Federal Trade Commission. Each tool has some
advantages and disadvantages as a potential foil to anticompetitive
regulation.
* Frederick Paul Furth Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article’s intended audience holds a common view that state
and local governments frequently adopt anticompetitive regulations
for the benefit of economic special interests and that these acts of
cronyism are pernicious to democracy, consumers, and economic ef-
ficiency.1 In other words, the costs to society of these regulations far
outweigh any reasonable benefits. A wise, beneficent, and all-
knowing Platonic guardian of the state would have little trouble in
striking down such regulations.
A further point of general consensus might relate to the particu-
larly pernicious effect of anticompetitive state and local regulation
in stifling new production innovation. In a variety of ways, our
constitutional order is stodgy. Its conservatism lends a hand to the
beneficiaries of incumbent technologies as they seek to deploy state
power to block or to slow the advent of new technologies that may
eventually displace the old, thereby preventing a realignment of
wealth and position. In recent years, innovative technologies
developed by companies such as Tesla, Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb have
encountered determined opposition from purveyors of predecessor
technologies, who have often used state and local regulation to
thwart innovation.2
So much for the common ground. Where consensus quickly
fragments is on the question of what, if anything, to do about such
regulations given that wise, beneficent, and all-knowing Platonic
guardians of the state are in short supply. In the imperfect messi-
ness that is liberal democracy, we frequently accept a host of com-
paratively petty inconveniences—political and economic—in order
to preserve larger values. Just as we tolerate many market failures
because the attempt at a regulatory fix might aggravate matters, we
may have to tolerate some political failures on the same grounds.
1. This Article focuses on anticompetitive state and local regulations. Federal regulations
sometimes pose similar problems. Whereas the constitutional antiparochialism principle
discussed in this Article might be available in such cases, FTC preemption, which only applies
when federal and state laws are in conflict, would not.
2. See infra Part I.
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Much of the difficulty has to do with the fact that while there
might be a broad consensus that state and local governments enact
many unjustifiable anticompetitive regulations, there is not a clear
consensus on which ones they are. The experience with economic
substantive due process in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, epitomized in Lochner v. New York,3 has left the Amer-
ican political psyche gun-shy about permitting judges to strike down
protectionist economic regulations on constitutional grounds.
Shortly after getting out of the Lochner business, the Supreme
Court announced that it would not get into the same business under
the guise of the antitrust laws.4 Over time, the development of the
Parker state action doctrine allowed the courts to play a somewhat
expanded role with respect to anticompetitive state and local reg-
ulations, but the zone of judicial review remains relatively con-
stricted.5
The purpose of this Article is to compare the deployment of
constitutional and antitrust tools to scrutinize potentially anti-
competitive state and local regulations against the backdrop of the
ubiquitous concern about “Lochnerizing” under the auspices of ei-
ther constitutional or statutory authority. Here is the question in a
nutshell: If one believes that courts (or perhaps federal administra-
tive agencies) should do somewhat more than they currently do to
scrutinize and potentially invalidate anticompetitive state and local
regulations, which lever should they pull—constitutional doctrines,
antitrust preemption, or both? Because there are some overlapping,
and some separate, institutional constraints and potential patholo-
gies between constitutional and antitrust law, it is important to
compare the two tools before deploying them.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I diagnoses the under-
lying features of democratic government that produce anticompe-
titive regulation. Some of this story is quite familiar, but I present
some new observations with respect to the role of technological in-
cumbency as a strong factor in invoking regulation to thwart in-
novation.
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
5. See infra Part II.B.
2019] SCRUTINIZING ANTICOMPETITIVE STATE REGULATIONS 1179
Part II explores the historical, ideological, and institutional
foundations of the current legal doctrines with respect to consti-
tutional and antitrust scrutiny of anticompetitive regulations. It
shows that, despite the narrowing of Parker immunity in recent
decades and some recent revival of equal protection and substantive
due process as constraints on anticompetitive regulation, a good
deal of anticompetitive state and local regulation remains impervi-
ous to legal challenge.
Part III compares the potential efficacy and pitfalls of deploying
constitutional or antitrust doctrines as checks on anticompetitive
state and local regulations. It considers: (1) the reach and domain
of constitutional and antitrust theories; (2) the ways in which each
theory could accommodate genuine and sufficient justifications for
the challenged regulations; (3) ways in which the antitrust and
constitutional tools differ substantively and procedurally; and (4)
ways in which the two theories might interact.
I. WHY ANTICOMPETITIVE REGULATION SUCCEEDS
This Article opened with the assumption that a wide universe of
unjustified state and local anticompetitive regulation exists that a
benevolent Platonic guardian of the state would instantly nullify.
Given this conceit, the presence of such regulations necessarily rep-
resents democratic failures, as democracy should, in principle, strive
for laws that confer positive, rather than negative, public benefit.
What, then, accounts for the pervasive existence of these undesir-
able regulations? The answer comes in two parts—a generic (and
largely familiar) story concerning anticompetitive regulations as a
whole, and a more specific story concerning the battle between
incumbent and innovative technologies.
A. The Generic Story
The generic story is largely familiar from public choice theory and
the literature on the Parker state action doctrine. Democratic
processes systematically fail to overcome two embedded hurdles to
matching regulatory schemes to broad public preferences: (1) the
asymmetrical distribution of costs and benefits of anticompetitive
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regulations, and (2) the externalization of costs on populations
outside the boundaries of the relevant democratic unit.6 In tandem,
these hurdles to democratic correction of cronyistic dispensations of
monopoly power by governmental regulators perpetuate regulatory
schemes that a broad majority of citizens would vote to overturn if
they understood the issue and were sufficiently motivated to invest
political energy in correcting it.7
The first democratic deficit, well documented in public choice
literature, arises because producers typically receive a much more
concentrated benefit from anticompetitive regulations in comparison
to the relatively unconcentrated cost imposed on consumers.8 A
small band of producers may lobby aggressively to enact or maintain
an anticompetitive scheme that permits the producers to collect
significant monopoly rents.9 Those rents, in turn, may be spread
across thousands or millions of consumers, each one paying a
relatively small increase in rent.10 Collective action constraints—the
cost of mobilizing consumer sentiment and action to oppose the
regulation—give the producers a systematic advantage in maintain-
ing the regulation.11 As John Shepard Wiley explained in bringing
public choice theory literature to bear on Parker immunity ques-
tions:
[I]f the group [of consumers] is large, individual members have
little incentive to participate because participation is personally
costly and contributes little to the group’s chances for successful
joint action. Small groups encounter fewer of such problems. If
group members behave in this rational self-interested manner,
then “there is a systematic tendency for exploitation of the great
by the small”; less numerous, more intensely concerned special
6. See DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
146-47 (2011).
7. See id. at 147-49.
8. E.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 5-6 (1951); JAMES
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Charles K. Rowley ed., 1962); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 14, 203-04 (1957); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
95 (1965).
9. Cf. John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 724-25 (1986).
10. Cf. id.
11. Id.
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interests can predictably outmatch more numerous, more mildly
concerned consumer or “public” interests in legislative or
regulatory fora—even though the actions of special interests
impose a net loss on society.12
The second deficit arises when governmental units—whether
state or local—externalize the costs of the anticompetitive regula-
tion outside their jurisdiction. The classic example is Parker itself,
in which 90 percent of the raisins subject to California’s agricultural
cartel mandate were sold outside of California.13 Out-of-state
consumers could not be counted on to mobilize democratically to
oppose the California regulation, as they had no political voice in
California.14
Many similar examples of jurisdictional cost externalization have
been documented.15 One arose in an important Supreme Court de-
cision on state action immunity, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire.16 Hallie, Seymour, Union, and Washington were unincorpo-
rated towns adjacent to the city of Eau Claire, Wisconsin.17 Their
citizens could not vote in Eau Claire, but Eau Claire wanted to
annex those territories into its boundaries, possibly through coercive
means.18 Eau Claire received federal funds to build a sewage
treatment plant in its service area, which covered the four towns,
then refused to supply sewage treatment services to the towns.19
However, the city did agree to provide treatment services to certain
homeowners in the towns if a majority of area voters voted by
referendum to allow Eau Claire to annex their homes and to com-
mit to use Eau Claire’s sewage and transportation services.20 The
towns claimed this scheme was designed to keep the other towns
from effectively competing with Eau Claire’s sewage collection and
transportation services.21 The scheme also possibly allowed the
12. Id. (footnote omitted).
13. See CRANE, supra note 6, at 147. See generally Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
14. CRANE, supra note 6, at 147-48.
15. See id. at 146-49.
16. 471 U.S. 34, 36 (1985).
17. Id.
18. CRANE, supra note 6, at 148.
19. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 37.
20. Id.
21. See id.
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city to raise costs for nonresidents while at the same time leverag-
ing the higher prices to bring the nonresidents (and presumably
their property taxes) into the city.22 Although the city’s motivation
was ultimately political rather than narrowly economic, it used an
anticompetitive strategy to dump monopoly costs on nonresidents
who could not vote to rescind the regulations until they joined the
city, at which point the question would be moot.23
Together, these two deficits—asymmetrical costs and benefits to
both producers and consumers and cost externalization—explain
why democratic processes often fail to weed out anticompetitive
regulations. Without concerted efforts by champions of consumer
interests to overcome collective action problems and mobilize sup-
port for regulatory reform, the regulatory barriers to competition
can linger indefinitely. As discussed next, these failures of demo-
cratic self-correction are exacerbated by regulations that entrench
incumbent technologies at the expense of innovation.
B. Additional Considerations Affecting Product Market
Innovation
Many of the contemporary regulatory battles between old and
new technologies (particularly those involving the sharing economy)
can be understood as follows. The incumbent regulatory scheme
arose many decades ago and may well have been legitimately
justified (in the sense of not imposing more costs than benefits) at
the time of its adoption.24 Our hypothesized Platonic guardian might
even have approved of it at the time of its adoption.25 The passage
of time and advent of new technologies has now eroded the original
basis of the regulation, and our Platonic guardian would therefore
want the regulation rescinded or reformed. However, incumbent
firms succeed in blocking or slowing innovative competition by
circling the wagons around the incumbent regulatory schemes.26 In
22. CRANE, supra note 6, at 148.
23. See generally Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. 34.
24. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
25. See supra Introduction.
26. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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these wars, the incumbents have a decisive advantage for at least
three structural reasons.
First, if the incumbent regulatory scheme has allowed the in-
cumbent firms to collect monopoly rents, then there may be a sharp
asymmetry of incentives between old and new firms.27 This is the
same asymmetry that attends any struggle between incumbent
monopolists and new competitive entrants: the monopolist is
seeking to protect a large market share at a monopoly price,
whereas the new entrant can only hope to gain a smaller market
share at a competitive price.28 Because the incumbent has more to
gain than the new entrant has to lose, the incumbent will be willing
to spend more to entrench the regulatory monopoly than the new
entrant will be to challenge it.29 This, in turn, discourages potential
new entrants from investing in innovative new technologies and
mounting political and market-oriented challenges to the incum-
bents.30
Second, the incumbents have the advantage of status quo biases
and fears about the consequences of technological change.31 Costs of
the existing system—to human safety, for example—may be seen as
an inevitable baseline, whereas potential risks from the new tech-
nology may be seen as incremental threats.32 Hence, risks and costs
of the existing system may be undercounted or not counted at all,
while risks and costs of the new system will be made to bear the full
weight of their risks and costs.
For example, in recent months there have been widely reported
stories of Uber drivers sexually abusing passengers.33 These stories
rarely report the base rate of abuse by taxi drivers or public transit
27. See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert & David M. G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the
Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 514, 514 (1982).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Cf. id. at 519.
31. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1003 (2003).
32. See id. at 1037.
33. E.g., Sara Ashley O’Brien, 9 Women Who Allege Assaults by Uber Drivers Want the
Right to Unite in Court, CNN (May 30, 2018, 3:03 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/30/
technology/uber-proposed-class-action-driver-abuse/index.html [https://perma.cc/USD8-7M
N8].
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workers, who might well present similar risks to passengers.34
Similarly, the news media seem to wait with bated breath to report
every accident involving a driverless vehicle35—even ones where
the vehicle was stationary and hit by another at-fault vehicle—
without reporting the base rate of nearly 40,000 deaths a year from
human-driven vehicles.36 The focus of news reporting seems to be on
the incremental risks created by automated driving without regard
to the baseline number of deaths that automated driving might
diminish.37 In principle, regulators should compare the likely risks
of allowing new technologies to those of perpetuating the incumbent
technology, but they often default to some version of the precaution-
ary principle, insisting that new technologies prove their safety and
efficacy in an absolute rather than comparative sense.38 Given this
baseline asymmetry, proponents of new technologies frequently
must overcome significant regulatory hurdles not faced by incum-
bent technologies. Or, incumbent technologies may persuade
regulators to force new technologies to play by rules that favor the
incumbent technologies—a form of raising rivals’ costs and creating
regulatory entry barriers.39
Finally, incumbents enjoy the generic benefits of incumbency in
a structurally conservative constitutional and political system. The
multiple “veto gates” to reform legislation—structural factors such
as bicameralism, presentment, filibusters, and committee struc-
tures40—empower technological incumbents to ride the status quo
for years or decades after our hypothetical Platonic guardian would
have instituted public-minded reforms.41
34. E.g., Sara Ashley O’Brien et al., CNN Investigation: 103 Uber Drivers Accused of
Sexual Assault or Abuse, CNN TECH (Apr. 30, 2018, 5:43 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/
30/technology/uber-driver-sexual-assault/index.html [https://perma.cc/B8JN-FP72].
35. E.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where
Robots Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/
uber-driverless-fatality.html [https://perma.cc/NDG3-D5NE].
36. See General Statistics, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, (2017), https://www.iihs.
org/iihs/topics/t/general-statistics/fatalityfacts/overview-of-fatality-facts [https://perma.cc/F8
S6-2AZZ] (reporting 37,461 deaths from motor vehicle crashes in the United States in 2016).
37. See supra notes 33-36.
38. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1019.
39. Daniel A. Crane, Distribution Innovation and Product Innovation (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
40. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003).
41. Cf. id.
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In combination, these three factors create additional barriers to
the expected flow of democratic processes toward majoritarian
equilibria—that is to say, equilibria that favor consumers’ interests
in competition and innovation over those of producers in capturing
monopoly rents. In light of these factors and the collective action
and cost externalization factors discussed earlier,42 it is unsurpris-
ing that regulation serves as a barrier to innovation.
C. An Illustration from Automobile Distribution
The ongoing story of Tesla’s efforts to break into the American
automobile market illustrates the stickiness of incumbent regula-
tions.43 For a variety of business reasons, when Tesla entered the
market in 2012, it decided that it would have to sell its all-electric
vehicles (EVs) directly to consumers, meaning that it would have to
open its own showrooms and service centers rather than outsourcing
that function to franchised dealers.44 Among other things, Tesla
believed that traditional dealerships would be reluctant and ill-
positioned to sell EVs and that Tesla therefore could not expect to
convince already skeptical customers to buy EVs unless it opened its
own retail facilities.45 Since the mid-twentieth century, however,
most states have adopted laws intended to protect dealers from
unfair exploitation by manufacturers.46 Among the provisions in
many of these state statutes is a prohibition on a manufacturer
opening its own showrooms and service centers.47 In many states,
manufacturers are required to distribute through independent
dealers only.48
Legislatures adopted these direct distribution prohibitions at a
time when American car manufacturing was dominated by the “Big
Three” (Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors) and many dealers were
42. See supra Part I.A.
43. See Daniel A. Crane, Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, and the Politics of Crony Cap-
italism, 101 IOWA L. REV. 573, 574-75 (2016).
44. Id. at 575, 580.
45. See Katie Fehrenbacher, 7 Reasons Why Tesla Insists on Selling Its Own Cars,
FORTUNE (Jan. 19, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/01/19/why-tesla-sells-directly/ [https://
perma.cc/X5TH-G3LH].
46. Crane, supra note 43, at 574.
47. Id.
48. See id.
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“mom and pop” businesses.49 State legislatures were convinced that
the dominant manufacturers were taking advantage of their fran-
chisees by selling cars through their company-owned stores at lower
prices than the dealers could afford to charge given the wholesale
prices charged by the manufacturers.50 The direct distribution
prohibitions were justified as correcting a severe imbalance in bar-
gaining power leading to contracts of adhesion and unfair exploita-
tion in manufacturer-dealer relations.51
Assuming that dealer protection rationale made sense in circa
1950, its basis has almost entirely vanished today. With the advent
of competition from Europe and Asia, the Big Three are no longer
dominant.52 Dealers have many choices of automobile franchisors
and hence considerably more power in negotiations over franchise
terms. Further, the dealers are no longer mostly mom and pops.53
Rather, most dealers are organized into multi-dealer groups, many
with hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in annual revenue.54
Indeed, some of the largest dealer groups have more annual revenue
than Tesla.55 Most significantly, the dealer protection rationale has
nothing to do with a company such as Tesla that does not seek to
distribute through dealers at all.56 No dealers, no dealer exploita-
tion.
Recognizing that the dealer protection rationale that justified the
original statutes no longer works, the dealers have attempted to
recast the direct distribution prohibitions as consumer protection
decisions.57 They have argued that forcing consumers to buy au-
tomobiles from dealers rather than from manufacturers will lead
to more price competition, and hence lower prices, and prevent
49. Id. at 574, 577.
50. See id. at 594.
51. Id. at 579.
52. See id. at 591.
53. Daniel A. Crane, The Fiction of Locally Owned Mom and Pop Car Dealers: Some Data
on Franchised Automobile Distribution in the State of Michigan 1 (Univ. of Mich. Law, Public
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 561, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000497 [https://perma.cc/6RCG-H75Y].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. (describing the rationale behind automobile dealership protections).
57. See Crane, supra note 43, at 579.
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consumers from manufacturer exploitation.58 These consumer pro-
tection arguments have been roundly rejected by economists,59 the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC),60 and major proconsumer groups
such as the Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Action,
Consumers for Automobile Reliability and Safety, and the American
Antitrust Institute.61 Nonetheless, the dealers have succeeded in
using the existing structure of dealer protection laws to block or
slow Tesla’s direct distribution program in a number of states.62
The Tesla story evidences most of the factors that contribute to
the persistence of anticompetitive regulations. The dealers have a
concentrated interest in preserving their protected position, while
the costs of that protectionism are spread out over millions of con-
sumers. In the state with arguably the most pernicious record with
respect to direct distribution reform—Michigan—there is a record
of antireform advocacy by a leading incumbent—General Motors—
and acquiescence by the political class to protect an in-state cham-
pion against an out-of-state challenger.63 Even though consumers
complain more about car dealers than about any other business,
indicating the baseline system is not particularly attractive to
them,64 the dealers have invoked fears about the risks of direct
distribution in opposition to legislative reforms. And legislative
58. See id. at 577-78.
59. Letter from Int’l Ctr. for Law & Econ., to Governor Chris Christie (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/tesla_letter_icle.pdf [https://perma.cc/GBC5-8SXZ].
60. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff: Missouri and New Jersey Should
Repeal Their Prohibitions on Direct-to-Consumer Auto Sales by Manufacturers (May 16,
2014), https://www.ftc. gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/ftc-staff-missouri-new-jersey-
should-repeal-their-prohibitions [https://perma.cc/9Z2W-989K].
61. See Am. Antitrust Inst. et al., Sign-on Statement to State Government Leaders About
the Anti-Consumer Effects of Laws Prohibiting Direct Distribution of Automobiles (Feb. 16,
2015), http://www2.itif.org/2015-tesla-big-tent-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/97B3-QV8T] (con-
taining the signatures of four of these trade groups); see also Daniel A. Crane, Why Intra-
Brand Dealer Competition Is Irrelevant to the Price Effects of Tesla’s Vertical Integration, 165
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 179, 180 (2017).
62. See Crane, supra note 61, at 179-80.
63. See Greg Gardner, Gov. Snyder Signs Bill Banning Direct Tesla Sales, DET. FREE
PRESS (Oct. 22, 2014, 11:22 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/general-motors/
2014/10/17/michigan-verge-banning-tesla-stores/17386251/ [https://perma.cc/DQP3-26P5].
64. See CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., 2013 CONSUMER COMPLAINT SURVEY REPORT 4 ( 2014),
https://consumerfed.org/pdfs/2013-consumer-survey-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQF6-P8U2];
CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., 2012 CONSUMER COMPLAINT SURVEY REPORT 5 (2013), https://
consumerfed.org/pdfs/top-10-consumer-complaints-07-31-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U46-
KVFN].
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inertia has slowed the consideration of reform bills in some states,
extending the incumbent regulatory scheme long past its reasonable
expiration date.65
The structural factors weighing against proconsumer and pro-
innovation reforms will not block Tesla forever. The company has
already seen significant successes in some state legislatures and
courts and is progressively penetrating the market.66 Yet it would
be misguided to consider the company’s eventual success a reason
not to worry about the structural factors entrenching anticompet-
itive regulations, especially those foreclosing innovation. No mo-
nopoly is permanent—even the most persistent are eventually
eroded.67 Innovative technologies will almost always find a way out
eventually, despite incumbent machinations.68 What incumbents
can buy is not monopoly in perpetuity but in extension.69 Those
years or decades of extension are costly to society. They represent
significant overcharges to consumers, misallocations of social re-
sources and, in the extreme, impairment to health and safety— even
lives lost.70
Not every instance of anticompetitive state or local regulation
exhibits the full set of explanatory factors discussed in this Article
as cleanly as the ongoing Tesla saga does. Yet the Tesla story is
more paradigmatic than idiosyncratic. Across the economy, incum-
bent technologies are structurally advantaged to deploy regulatory
forces to stifle or slow innovation.
65. In Michigan, at the time he signed a bill effectively blocking Tesla from direct dis-
tribution in the state in 2014, Governor Snyder called for a reexamination of the state’s motor
vehicle laws in light of changing economic and technological circumstances. Gov. Rick Snyder
Signs Bipartisan Bill Clarifying Existing Direct Auto Sales Law, MICHIGAN.GOV (Oct. 21,
2014), https://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277-57577_57657-339774--,00.html [https://
perma.cc/KFZ6-5VMA]. As of this writing, no legislative reforms have been undertaken.
66. Crane, supra note 61, at 179.
67. Kenneth G. Elzinga, Controversy: Are Antitrust Laws Immoral? A Response to Jeffrey
Tucker, 1 J. MKTS. & MORALITY 83, 86 (1998) (observing the fact that “no monopoly is per-
manent” is not a sufficient reason to disregard moral evils of monopoly).
68. See id.
69. Cf. id.
70. See supra Part I.B.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AS A CHECK ON
ANTICOMPETITIVE REGULATION
If democratic processes fail to check anticompetitive state and
local regulations on a systematic basis, then what can be done about
it? Among the potential tools are institutional efforts to address the
quality of legislation and regulation through democratic processes,
such as creating governmental competition advocacy bodies within
state and local governments or using federal purse strings to
incentivize state and local governments to reevaluate their regula-
tions. These democratic options are important, but they often fall
prey to the pathologies of democratic decision making identified
earlier.71 Competition advocates—whether in government or in the
private sector—often face formidable structural barriers to advanc-
ing the procompetition interest: entrenched incumbent monopolies,
difficulties in mobilizing consumer support given the often diffuse
nature of consumer harm, and institutional biases against change.72
In addition to the democratic options, there are what could be
styled counterdemocratic possibilities, insofar as they involve the
use of courts or agencies to strike down anticompetitive statutes and
regulations as inconsistent with some overarching norm of federal
law, whether statutory or constitutional.73 These counterdemocratic
possibilities often do not run into the same structural status quo
biases as the democratic possibilities do. For example, advocates of
a legal theory for overruling an anticompetitive state or local reg-
ulation do not have to mobilize broad political support for their
position or surmount the “veto gates”74 built into ordinary political
processes. Rather, they typically only have to persuade a small set
of elite decision makers that their position is legally correct. It is
with these counter-democratic possibilities that this Article is
primarily interested.
71. See supra Part I.A.
72. See supra Parts I.A-B.
73. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and the Judicial Virtues, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 25-
27.
74. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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The counterdemocratic or countermajoritarian quality of these
deployments of judicial review is what places their use in some
doubt,75 even granting the assumption that they are targeting
objectively undesirable regulations.76 In the arc of American history,
the courts have vacillated in their willingness to engage in such
judicial review since the mid-twentieth century. Late nineteenth
and early twentieth century courts were willing to engage in broad
judicial review of economic regulation,77 but the tide turned strongly
against such review in the mid-twentieth century.78 Only in recent
years have glimmers of a return to some form of strong judicial
review of anticompetitive regulations made a reappearance.79
A. Lochner, anti-Lochner, and Parker
The stage for the current constellation of judicial doctrines and
attitudes towards federal judicial review of anticompetitive state
and local regulations was set through the progression of Lochner-era
substantive due process, the anti-Lochner constitutional revolution
of 1937, and the extension of anti-Lochner sentiment to federal
antitrust law in the creation of Parker’s state action immunity
doctrine in 1943.80 In 1905, the Supreme Court in Lochner struck
down a New York law regulating bakeshop working hours on
substantive due process grounds,81 over Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s famous objection that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”82 During the
Progressive and New Deal eras, Lochner and Lochnerism were
broadly vilified for interfering with progressive reforms and
substituting judges’ economic views for those of legislatures.83 In the
New Deal constitutional revolution associated with the year 1937
(although spanning a few years in either direction), the Supreme
75. See Crane, supra note 73, at 3-4.
76. See supra INTRODUCTION.
77. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
78. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 727, 730-32 (1963).
79. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225-28 (6th Cir. 2002).
80. See generally Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Lochner, 198 U.S. 45.
81. See 198 U.S. at 64.
82. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
83. See, e.g., John A. Sparks, The U.S. Supreme Court During the Progressive Era—
Unfairly Maligned, 2 GROVE CITY C. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165, 166-67, 188-90 (2011).
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Court announced it was getting out of the Lochner business—that
it would not strike down economic legislation simply on the grounds
that it was, in the judgment of the court, ill-considered.84
Over time, it became clear that the anti-Lochner jurisprudence
extended to nakedly anticompetitive regulations adopted to favor
economic special interests to the detriment of the consuming public.
In cases such as Williamson v. Lee Optical85 and Ferguson v. Skru-
pa,86 there was a fairly apparent record that the regulations in ques-
tion had been adopted to stifle competition and benefit economic
special interests, but the courts refused to create an exception to the
anti-Lochner doctrine on those grounds.87 In Williamson, the Court
acknowledged that the “Oklahoma law may exact a needless,
wasteful requirement in many cases,” but insisted that the “day is
gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvi-
dent, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”88
Rather, the Court held that “[f]or protection against abuses by
legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.”89
In 1943, the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown also made clear
that it would not permit the federal Sherman Act to be used as an
end-run around the anti-Lochner cases.90 Parker involved both
dormant commerce clause and Sherman Act challenges to Califor-
nia’s Agricultural Prorate Act, which forced farmers into a market-
ing plan that effectively operated as an output reduction cartel run
by farmers.91 The Supreme Court rejected both challenges.92 Finding
“nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature,”93 the Court
created a doctrine of state action immunity for anticompetitive state
84. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 257 (1998).
85. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
86. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
87. See id. at 727, 730-32; Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487.
88. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88.
89. Id. at 488.
90. See 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
91. Id. at 346, 348-49.
92. Id. at 350-51.
93. Id.
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and local laws.94 The effect of this ruling was to restrict the Sher-
man Act’s coverage solely to purely private conduct.95 Anticompet-
itive schemes orchestrated by the state would be excluded from
judicial review.96 As Judge Merrick Garland has observed, Parker is
best understood as a continuation of the post-1937 jurisprudence
rejecting Lochner:
Parker v. Brown was much less a case about judicial faith in
economic regulation than it was a case about judicial respect for
the political process. Parker was indeed a child of its times, but
the most salient element of that historical context was the
Court’s recent rejection of the Lochner-era doctrine of substan-
tive due process, under which federal courts struck down eco-
nomic regulations they viewed as unreasonably interfering with
the liberty of contract. Having only just determined not to use
the Constitution in that manner, the Court was not about to
resurrect Lochner in the garb of the Sherman Act.97
B. The Potential for an Increased Level of Judicial Scrutiny
As of 1943, one would have been justified in believing that, at
least from the perspective of federal judicial review, anticompetitive
state and local regulations would receive a free pass unless they
94. See Jason Kornmehl, State Action on Appeal: Parker Immunity and the Collateral
Order Doctrine in Antitrust Litigation, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2015).
95. Id. at 7.
96. See, e.g., James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence with International
Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV.
1555, 1570 (2010).
97. Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political
Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 499-500 (1987) (footnotes omitted); see also Cooper & Kovacic,
supra note 96, at 1570 (“Parker then can be seen as a necessary concession to anticompetitive
state regulation to avoid a return to the Lochner era.... Once the federal judiciary got out of
the business of second-guessing the wisdom of states’ economic regulation under substantive
due process analysis, it could hardly reopen this line of attack under the guise of antitrust.
Parker prevented this outcome.”); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action
Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 227, 230 n.20 (1987)
(“The Court’s own unsatisfying experience with economic due process during the Lochner era,
just prior to Parker, no doubt increased the Court’s sensitivity to the importance of
independent state economic choices.”); William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State
Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 624
(“Parker was decided largely on the ground that the Court was unwilling to reenter the
political mire of the Lochner era under the guise of Sherman Act preemption analysis.”).
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committed certain egregious violations, such as disadvantaging
“discrete and insular minorities”98 or discriminating against out-of-
state commerce.99 But the judicial impulse to cast a stern glance at
perniciously anticompetitive regulations could not be forever stifled,
and before long cracks began to appear in the courts’ anti-
Lochnerian resolve.
Antitrust law and its state action immunity doctrine were the
first to move in a significantly more interventionist direction. By the
time of the Midcal decision, the state action immunity doctrine had
been narrowed to permit judicial scrutiny unless the state regula-
tion met a two-part test: (1) clear and affirmative expression of the
anticompetitive policy by the sovereign state itself, and (2) active
supervision of the policy’s implementation by state actors.100 Under
this structure, the courts have invalidated a number of anticompeti-
tive state regulatory schemes—most recently the practice of dele-
gating regulatory power to occupational licensing boards staffed
with potentially self-interested industry participants.101
The Midcal test invokes a democracy-reinforcement theory of
antitrust judicial review.102 States may enact anticompetitive reg-
ulations so long as they take conspicuous responsibility for them.103
If the state can be obviously identified with the scheme, then
perhaps citizens will “vote out the bums” if the costs to consumers
are too high.104 Alas, many anticompetitive regulations escape
Midcal’s net because of the systemic factors identified in the
previous section.105 Even when a state conspicuously takes owner-
ship of an anticompetitive scheme, democratic processes may fail to
provide a remedy because of the asymmetry of costs and benefits
98. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”).
99. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338
(2007) (“To determine whether a law violates this so-called ‘dormant’ aspect of the Commerce
Clause, we first ask whether it discriminates on its face against interstate commerce.”).
100. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
101. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1107-09, 1117 (2015).
102. Daniel A. Crane & Adam Hester, State-Action Immunity and Section 5 of the FTC Act,
115 MICH. L. REV. 365, 374 (2016).
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See supra Part II.A.
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between producers and consumers, the externalization of costs
outside the voting jurisdiction, and the entrenched advantage of
technological incumbency.106
In light of the limited efficacy of Midcal’s regime, one could
consider additional ways to increase the level of antitrust scrutiny
of anticompetitive state and local regulations. Commentators have
proposed various such doctrinal approaches to invigorate antitrust
preemption. For example, courts might adopt a cost-externalization
test, which would invalidate regulatory schemes that externalize a
disproportionate share of monopoly overcharges outside the bound-
aries of the political district enacting the regulation.107 Or, as I have
proposed elsewhere, they might read the Parker doctrine as entirely
inapplicable to enforcement actions by the FTC—a legal question
that the Supreme Court has held is still open.108 In the event that
the courts hold Parker inapplicable to the FTC, the Commission
might play a significantly enhanced role in checking anticompetitive
abuses by state and local governments.
Despite calls for a broader use of federal antitrust law to police
anticompetitive state and local regulations, the Supreme Court con-
tinues to refine the Parker doctrine with an eye on Lochner. Then-
Justice Rehnquist once worried that the Court should not “engage
in the same wide-ranging, essentially standardless inquiry into the
reasonableness of local regulation that th[e] Court ... properly
rejected” in terminating Lochnerism.109 In his dissenting opinion in
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, Justice
106. Crane & Hester, supra note 102, at 374-76.
107. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism,
75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (1997) (proposing a two-part test: “(1) Does a state regulation
generate significant monopoly spillovers onto nonresidents?”; and “(2) Was the state
regulation decided without political participation of the affected nonresidents as evidenced
by the lack of interstate regulatory agreement? If the answer to both questions is yes, then
the state regulation fails the spillover test for economic efficiency, and a Sherman Act review
of the regulation is appropriate”).
108. See Crane & Hester, supra note 102, at 368.
109. Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); see also Mass. Food Ass’n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 197 F.3d
560, 565 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1105 (2000) (“To allow federal judges to decide
which of these legislative enactments should survive and which should be condemned comes
close to reintroducing the kind of judgments that got the Supreme Court into so much trouble
in the Lochner era.”).
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Rehnquist warned about the risks of opening up antitrust review of
municipal regulations in a way that would require cities to justify
their regulations, and the courts, in turn, to weigh those justifica-
tions.110 Rehnquist wrote:
If the Rule of Reason were “modified” to permit a municipality
to defend its regulation on the basis that its benefits to the
community outweigh its anticompetitive effects, the courts will
be called upon to review social legislation in a manner reminis-
cent of the Lochner era. Once again, the federal courts will be
called upon to engage in the same wide-ranging, essentially
standardless inquiry into the reasonableness of local regulation
that this Court has properly rejected. Instead of “liberty of
contract” and “substantive due process,” the procompetitive
principles of the Sherman Act will be the governing standard by
which the reasonableness of all local regulation will be deter-
mined. Neither the Due Process Clause nor the Sherman Act
authorizes federal courts to invalidate local regulation of the
economy simply upon opining that the municipality has acted
unwisely. The Sherman Act should not be deemed to authorize
federal courts to “substitute their social and economic beliefs for
the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.”
The federal courts have not been appointed by the Sherman Act
to sit as a “superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legisla-
tion.”111
Also in the shadow of Lochner, recent years have shown glimmers
of a reinvigoration of constitutional doctrines checking anticom-
petitive abuses by state and local governments. The negative or
dormant commerce clause—limited by the Parker Court on anti-
Lochner grounds—has occasionally been deployed to invalidate not
only anticompetitive regulatory schemes112 that discriminated
against out-of-state interests, but also, on occasion, those that im-
pose significant burdens on interstate commerce without a sufficient
justification.113 As of this writing, Tesla is testing the limits of these
110. 455 U.S. 40, 67 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 67-68 (internal citations omitted).
112. See Crane, supra note 43, at 575-76.
113. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“[Nondiscriminatory statutes
should] be upheld unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.”).
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doctrines in its challenge to Michigan’s direct distribution law.114 Its
complaint for injunctive relief asserts:
[Michigan’s] [p]articularly egregious protectionist legislation ...
blocks Tesla from pursuing legitimate business activities and
subjects it to arbitrary and unreasonable regulation in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
subjects Tesla to arbitrary and unreasonable classifications in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; and discriminates against interstate commerce and
restricts the free flow of goods between states in violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause.115
Thus far, Tesla has survived a motion to dismiss in federal court
and won a key discovery motion seeking automobile dealers’ com-
munications concerning the Michigan ban on direct distribution.116
Perhaps even more significant have been a handful of court of
appeals decisions applying equal protection principles to invalidate
anticompetitive regulations designed solely to protect a discrete
group of economic actors from competition—although there remains
a circuit split over this practice. Morbidly, the most significant cases
have all been related to funeral parlors and casket sales.
In 2004, the Tenth Circuit in Powers v. Harris rejected a consti-
tutional challenge to an Oklahoma statute that limited casket sales
to licensed funeral parlors.117 The court accepted the premise that
the statute had no genuine health and safety rationale and was “a
classic piece of special interest legislation designed to extract mo-
nopoly rents from consumers’ pockets and funnel them into the
coffers of a small but politically influential group of business peo-
ple—namely, Oklahoma funeral directors.”118 Nonetheless, the court
held its hands were tied by the anti-Lochner cases—particularly
114. See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Tesla Motors, Inc. v.
Johnson, No. 1:16-cv-01158 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2016, ECF No. 1).
115. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8.
116. See Linda Chiem, 6th Circ. Says Mich. Dealers Can’t Duck Tesla Info Grab, LAW360
(Mar. 5, 2018, 9:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1018712/ [https://perma.cc/Q3SB-
NLAD].
117. 379 F.3d 1208, 1211, 1214, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005).
118. See id. at 1218-21 (quoting Appellant Br. at 26).
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Williamson and Ferguson, which also involved (arguably) nakedly
parochial anticompetitive regulations.119
On the other hand, in their own casket cases, the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits invalidated the anticompetitive schemes on equal protec-
tion grounds, holding that “protecting a discrete interest group from
economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose” and
therefore fails even rational basis review.120 This exercise of what
Judge Ginsburg calls “rational basis with economic bite” could grow
into a significant check on anticompetitive state and local regulation
if utilized more expansively.121 If this Article’s premise is valid—that
regulations designed solely to protect “discrete interest group[s]
from economic competition”122 are pervasive—then the federal courts
have their work cut out for them if they take up the casket maxim
with seriousness.
However, it is far from certain that they will or should. Despite
the movement towards enhanced scrutiny of anticompetitive eco-
nomic cronyism just described, the ghosts of Lochner continue to
loom large. Even judges unsympathetic to the casket regulations
may be concerned about the prospect of unelected judges substitut-
ing their own economic preferences for those of democratically
elected representatives. In Powers, the Tenth Circuit listed a series
of classically anti-Lochner rationales (including a rejection of the
role of the Platonic guardian hypothesized in this Article) for
refusing to embrace the Sixth Circuit’s antiparochialism principle:
First, in practical terms, we would paralyze state governments
if we undertook a probing review of each of their actions,
constantly asking them to “try again.” Second, even if we
assumed such an exalted role, it would be nothing more than
substituting our view of the public good or the general welfare
for that chosen by the states. As a creature of politics, the
definition of the public good changes with the political winds.
There simply is no constitutional or Platonic form against which
119. See id.
120. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Craigmiles v.
Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002)), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 952 (2013); Craigmiles, 312
F.3d at 224, 228-29.
121. See Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rational Basis with Economic Bite, 8
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1055, 1065-67 (2014).
122. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224.
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we can (or could) judge the wisdom of economic regulation.
Third, these admonitions ring especially true when we are
reviewing the regulatory actions of states, who, in our federal
system, merit great respect as separate sovereigns.123
So here is the question for those who accept this Article’s central
premise regarding the prevalence of anticompetitive state and local
regulation and yet worry, like the Powers court, about a return to
Lochner: If one is interested in pulling additional judicial levers to
scrutinize anticompetitive state and local regulations, but worried
about returning to Lochnernism, how do the constitutional and
antitrust levers compare? Are both equally susceptible to misuse
and abuse, is one less risky than the other, and are there limits that
could be placed on both to cabin their potential risks? This Article’s
final Part compares the constitutional and antitrust tools as po-
tential foils to anticompetitive state and local regulation to help
answer these questions.
III. COMPARING THE RISKS AND LIMITS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTITRUST TOOLS
A. Limiting the Scope of Judicial Review to Regulations Affecting
Competition
The fear of a return to Lochnerism is in large part a fear that
judicial review of economic regulatory decisions is a Pandora’s box
that, once open, would quickly unleash a full-scale movement to-
ward a substitution of judicial economic philosophies for those of the
democratically responsive branches.124 Hence, in the current con-
stellation of Lochner-phobia, it is important to explain how any doc-
trine that invites increased judicial scrutiny of economic regulation
would be cabined or restrained by a workable limitation principle.
Both the antitrust and constitutional tools under consideration
embody such a limitation principle insofar as they do not propose
universal federal scrutiny of all undesirable state economic reg-
ulation. Instead, they limit the scrutiny to regulations that harm
123. 379 F.3d 1208, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005).
124. See, e.g., id.
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competition for the benefit of identifiable special interests. In other
words, the prima facie case in either event requires demonstration
of competitive harm as opposed to merely social undesirability.125
The “competitive harm” limitation principle excludes from judicial
review a wide set of regulations and hence limits the range of judi-
cial interference with state regulatory schemes. Many cronyist reg-
ulations line the pockets of politically connected special interests
without necessarily impairing competition. Consider, for example,
a city ordinance that required disposal of a certain kind of medical
waste at a pharmacy. Assume further that the waste in question
could be safely disposed of through ordinary garbage collection, and
the sole purpose of the scheme in question was to provide pharma-
cies with an opportunity to charge a fee for collecting the waste. Our
hypothesized Platonic guardian would wish to overturn that regu-
lation but could not do so on the constitutional or antitrust grounds
under consideration because the regulation in question does not
limit competition in any important sense. Rather than stifling com-
petition in a legitimate market, it creates a new market for an un-
desired and unnecessary service.
Lochner-phobes may wonder whether this limitation principle is
limited enough. Although the limitation carves off a large swath of
cronyist regulations from review, it still includes a relatively large
universe of regulations, creating the possibility that judges will have
a free hand to strike down many important state regulatory pro-
grams in the name of enhanced competition. Those less worried
about Lochner and more willing to encourage judicial review of
economic regulation may worry that the limitation principle is too
limited and that it would allow a vast universe of cronyist regula-
tion to escape judicial scrutiny on the same grounds that much
cutthroat business behavior escapes antitrust scrutiny today—it
may be unethical or undesirable, but does not fall within the
purview of the antitrust laws because it does not impair general
market competitiveness.126
125. Id.
126. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1998) (noting that antitrust
law does not cover routine business torts and that “other laws, for example, ‘unfair
competition’ laws, business tort laws, or regulatory laws, provide remedies for various
‘competitive practices thought to be offensive to proper standards of business morality’”
(quoting 3 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 78 (1996))); Brooke
1200 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1175
Limiting the scope of judicial review to economic regulations
impairing competition also raises a question of legal principle. As
to antitrust, it is easy to justify such a principle. Notwithstanding
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s protestation that the Sherman Act “says
nothing about competition,”127 a century of judicial construction has
oriented the antitrust laws towards a singular focus on com-
petition.128 On the other hand, it is not obvious that constitutional
scrutiny should rise or fall on the effects a cronyist regulation has
on competition. It may be true that “protecting a discrete interest
group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental
purpose,”129 but it seems equally true that dispensing economic
rents to favored discrete interest groups more generally is also not
a legitimate government purpose. In either case, the argument for
limiting judicial review is not that the set of targeted regulations is
constitutionally legitimate, but that the process of separating sheep
from goats is fraught with the potential for judicial usurpation.
B. Considering Governmental Justifications for Restraints on
Competition
Assuming that judicial review of anticompetitive state and local
regulations is to occur with some degree of bite, the fighting ques-
tion may often become how to evaluate the state’s proffered jus-
tifications for the restraint on competition. Both antitrust and
constitutional tools would need to allow ample room for the state to
demonstrate verifiable justifications for the challenged regulations.
To put this point in antitrust parlance, there are no per se unlawful
state restraints on competition—the state’s reasons for regulating
will always be up for review in judicial or administrative proceed-
ings challenging their validity.
Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993) (“Even an act of
pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, state a claim
under the federal antitrust laws; those laws do not create a federal law of unfair competition
or ‘purport to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against persons engaged in
interstate commerce.’” (quoting Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 826 (1945))).
127. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
128. It has become a maxim of antitrust jurisprudence that the antitrust laws protect
“competition, not competitors.” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488
(1977) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
129. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002).
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The critical question is how much interrogation into the state’s
proffered justifications a court or reviewing agency would, could, or
should undertake. In conventional post-Lochner terms, economic
regulations were subjected to no more than rational basis review—
an exceedingly deferential standard of review.130 The state did not
have to advance any empirical support for its proffered justifications
and, indeed, did not have to advance any justifications at all.131
Judges were supposed to uphold the regulation if they could con-
ceive of any justification that might plausibly support it:
A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to
sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. “[A] legisla-
tive choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or
empirical data.” A statute is presumed constitutional, and “[t]he
burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to
negative every conceivable basis which might support it,”
whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record. Finally,
courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a
legislature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit
between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational-
basis review because it “is not made with mathematical nicety
or because in practice it results in some inequality.”132
That sort of rational basis review is far from the sort of review
conducted by the Craigmiles and St. Joseph Abbey courts in striking
down the Tennessee and Louisiana casket rules.133 Those courts re-
quired evidentiary support for states’ claimed justifications and
subjected the states’ claims to rigorous cross-examination for logical
consistency.134 In the Sixth Circuit case—Craigmiles—the court re-
jected the state’s arguments that the casket regulation protected
casket quality and public health, made it more feasible for casket
sellers to advise bereaved families about which casket was most
suitable for their needs, and protected against sharp business
130. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
131. See id.
132. Id. at 320-21 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
133. See generally St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013); Craigmiles,
312 F.3d 220. 
134. See St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 223-26; Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225-26.
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dealing.135 The court found these arguments inconsistent with the
state’s own regulatory practices and unsupported by any record
evidence.136 Similarly, in the Fifth Circuit case—St. Joseph Abbey—
the court repeated the familiar proposition that “rational basis
review places no affirmative evidentiary burden on the govern-
ment,” but quickly added that “plaintiffs may nonetheless negate a
seemingly plausible basis for the law by adducing evidence of ir-
rationality.”137 The court then inquired into evidentiary support for
the state’s proferred “rational bases.”138 For example, on the os-
tensible consumer protection rationale for prohibiting casket sales
except by licensed funeral parlors, the court observed that the FTC
had largely rejected this argument as an empirical matter, noting
that the FTC found “insufficient evidence that ... third-party sellers
of funeral goods are engaged in widespread unfair or deceptive acts
or practices” and that the empirical “record [is] ‘bereft of evidence
indicating significant consumer injury caused by third-party
sellers.’”139
This form of review resembles antitrust litigation, where once a
plaintiff raises a prima facie case of anticompetitive effect (outside
of per se rules, where no justifications are allowed), the defendant
typically can proffer procompetitive justifications but bears the
burden of offering evidentiary support.140 Although giving lip service
to the norms of rational basis review, these courts were in fact
taking a hard look at the states’ proffered justifications once the
regulation in question appeared prima facie to meet the description
of a measure designed to protect “discrete interest group[s] from
economic competition.”141
Inquiries into offsetting justifications for prima facie suspect con-
duct raise two doctrinal-analytical questions: (1) how tight must the
fit between means and ends be in order for the conduct in question
to survive scrutiny, and (2) once the conduct has been shown to ad-
vance legitimate ends, should its harms be balanced against its
135. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225-28.
136. See id.
137. St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 223.
138. Id. at 223-26.
139. Id. at 225 (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. 13740, 13742, 13745 (Mar. 14, 2008)).
140. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992).
141. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224.
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benefits, or should it simply be deemed lawful without any balanc-
ing?142 Both constitutional and antitrust tools for addressing anti-
competitive regulation would need to address these questions.
As to the first question—the required tightness of means-ends
fit—both constitutional and antitrust law already contain suitable
doctrines. Moving up the ladder of scrutiny from rational basis
review, intermediate scrutiny in constitutional law (such as that
applicable to content-neutral restrictions on speech) requires that
the restriction in question advance important governmental
interests and not burden the protected interest (speech in the
speech cases, competition in competition cases) more than necessary
to further these interests.143 The fit between means and ends need
be only “reasonable,” not strictly necessary or essential.144 Unless
the constitutional limitation on anticompetitive cronyism should
fall into the more stringent strict scrutiny category—a very doubt-
ful possibility—this sort of fit between regulatory means and ends
would seem applicable.
Antitrust law shares a similar approach to the less restrictive
alternative analysis under the rule of reason, and it too would pre-
sumably apply to government restraints on competition under an
expanded form of judicial review.145 As explained in the Justice
Department and FTC competitor collaboration guidelines, a rea-
sonable, but not essential, fit between means and ends is required
to credit proffered justifications for prima facie anticompetitive
agreements:
The Agencies consider only those efficiencies for which the
relevant agreement is reasonably necessary. An agreement may
be “reasonably necessary” without being essential. However, if
the participants could have achieved or could achieve similar
efficiencies by practical, significantly less restrictive means, then
the Agencies conclude that the relevant agreement is not
142. See generally C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 927 (2016).
143. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (“A content-neutral
regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances important
governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden
substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.”).
144. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993).
145. See Hemphill, supra note 142, at 938-39. 
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reasonably necessary to their achievement. In making this as-
sessment, the Agencies consider only alternatives that are prac-
tical in the business situation faced by the participants; the
Agencies do not search for a theoretically less restrictive alter-
native that is not realistic given business realities.146
A potential difference between constitutional and antitrust
analysis might arise on the second important means-ends ques-
tion—whether to balance harms against benefits of the regulatory
restriction. For example, suppose that a regulation limiting ride-
sharing services resulted in some small safety benefit to customers
but an arguably much greater harm to customers in the form of
diminished choice of service options and higher prices. Should a
reviewing court or agency balance the safety enhancements against
the harms to competition, or should it rather conclude that, having
shown a legitimate reason for its existence, the regulation should
stand?
Although intermediate scrutiny in constitutional law is often
described as a “balancing test,” courts do not generally engage in
explicit balancing after passing the less restrictive alternatives
inquiry.147 Some degree of value judgment must be embedded in
the inquiry into whether the state’s interest is sufficiently “impor-
tant,” but it is rare to see a court say, in effect, that although the
state’s interest is concededly important and the regulation at stake
is reasonably related to it, the harms caused by the regulation
outweigh its benefits.148 For purposes of the principle against pro-
tecting “discrete interest group[s] from economic competition,” it
seems apparent that there is no room for balancing at all, as a state
146. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COL-
LABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.36(b) (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-
competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7X2M-72TU].
147. See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. United States, 787 F.3d 142, 152 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Our
analysis when applying intermediate scrutiny ‘always encompasses some balancing of the
state interest and the means used to effectuate that interest,’ and ‘varies to some extent from
context to context, and case to case.’” (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 124 (3d Cir.
1999), aff’d, 532 U.S. 514 (2001))).
148. For a famous example of the more common occurrence—that is, a state policy passing
intermediate scrutiny analysis and being upheld, see generally Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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regulation that serves some legitimate end by definition is not “sim-
ple economic protectionism.”149
By contrast, antitrust law is, in principle, supposed to require
open-ended balancing at this final step: “if the monopolist’s pro-
competitive justification stands unrebutted, then the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct out-
weighs the procompetitive benefit.”150 If followed in state action
doctrine cases, this sort of balancing could precipitate serious ac-
cusations of Lochnerizing, as it would put judges in the position of
substituting their own preferences for market outcomes over the
state’s legitimate regulatory objectives.
Fortunately, although antitrust law nominally calls for balanc-
ing, courts typically do not engage in it.151 Even in Microsoft—the
case that most explicitly and authoritatively called for final-stage
balancing—the D.C. Circuit engaged in very little, if any, true bal-
ancing.152 Perhaps because of the incommensurability between
anticompetitive or procompetitive effects or concern about chilling
procompetitive conduct, courts tend to exonerate competitive be-
havior that is necessary to procompetitive effects without asking
whether the harms outweigh the benefits.153 In order to stave off
Lochnerizing concerns, any expanded antitrust review of state and
local regulations might need to formalize this practice doctrinally:
Once a state demonstrates that the regulation in question is rea-
sonably tailored to achieve some legitimate governmental objective,
149. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)) (“Thus, where simple economic protectionism is effected
by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”).
150. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Abbott
Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 422 (D. Del. 2006) (“Contrary to
Defendants’ assertion, Plaintiffs are not required to prove that the new formulations were
absolutely no better than the prior version or that the only purpose of the innovation was to
eliminate the complementary product of a rival. Rather, as in Microsoft, if Plaintiffs show
anticompetitive harm from the formulation changes, that harm will be weighed against any
benefits presented by Defendants.”).
151. Further, some courts explicitly reject final-stage balancing. See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic
Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (“There is no
room in this analysis for balancing the benefits or worth of a product improvement against
its anticompetitive effects. If a monopolist’s design change is an improvement, it is ‘nec-
essarily tolerated by the antitrust laws,’ unless the monopolist abuses or leverages its mo-
nopoly power in some other way when introducing the product.” (internal citation omitted)).
152. Crane, supra note 73, at 17. See generally Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34.
153. See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 1000.
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antitrust does not require balancing of the harms to competition
against the legitimate governmental objectives.
A final question unique to antitrust review is whether, when it
comes to means-ends review, the catalogue of permissible ends is
limited to those recognized by antitrust law as “procompetitive.”
One of the important doctrinal and policy structures of antitrust law
is a division of the world into virtues that are said to be “procom-
petitive” and those that are not.154 To count as a legitimate virtue in
the antitrust domain, an effect must be “procompetitive,” meaning
that it must work to enhance or improve market competition.155
Supposed benefits of a restraint that assume that competition is
itself the problem in need of curtailment are labeled with the epi-
thet of “ruinous competition” theories and are dismissed as incon-
sistent with the Sherman Act’s procompetition policy.156
While this single-minded devotion to competition may make sense
as to the world of private restraints, it is less clear that it can be
applied sensibly to governmental regulation. Do governments not
have the right to take the view that competition of certain types
causes social evils that should be curtailed? For example, many
regulatory restrictions on alcohol and tobacco distribution are
designed to decrease competition and hence reduce output as
compared to that which would be obtained in a competitive
market.157 While it may be undesirable for private actors to limit
harmful output through private means, the state’s police power
surely includes the right to do so, including by limiting com-
petition.158 This suggests that the range of regulatory interests
154. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States 256 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
155. This distinction has its origins in Justice Brandeis’s division of restraints of trade into
those “merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition.” Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,
238 (1918).
156. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (“Congress has
not left with us the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing schemes are wise
or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry of ruinous competition
and competitive evils to be a defense to price-fixing conspiracies.”).
157. See Daniel A. Crane, Harmful Output in the Antitrust Domain: Lessons from the
Tobacco Industry, 39 GA. L. REV. 321, 357-58 (2005).
158. See, e.g., Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Cuomo, 592 F. Supp. 2d 684, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(upholding tobacco Master Settlement Agreement against an antitrust challenge based in
part on “important public health goals and substantial fiscal benefits” of the MSA regime),
aff’d, 624 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2010).
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states might legitimately advance in support of challenged regula-
tions would be broader than those deemed “procompetitive” in
conventional antitrust analysis.
Opening the door to a wider scope of justifications in cases where
the restraint on competition is imposed by governmental rather
than private actors would appear on first impression to favor the
government. Such a widening of the rule of reason, however, raises
precisely the Lochnerizing concern raised by Justice Rehnquist in
his previously quoted City of Boulder dissent.159 If courts were called
upon to balance health and safety benefits against traditional com-
petition concerns around prices and innovation, then they might
well slip into a Lochnerizing mold. But perhaps such concerns could
be abated by limiting the reviewing court or agency’s role to deter-
mining whether the regulation in question actually supported the
state’s proffered goals. As long as the goals were permissible (that
is, not simply protecting discrete interest groups from competition
as a form of political patronage) and the regulations were reason-
ably related to the goals, the reviewing court or agency would not
inquire more broadly into the regulation’s overall desirability.
C. Institutional and Procedural Distinctions
Antitrust preemption and constitutional review are differently
situated in one significant way: Constitutional equal protection,
substantive due process, and dormant commerce clause principles
are privately enforceable by any party that meets the Article III
standing requirements—which, in this context, means at least
anyone directly affected by a regulation impairing competition.160
Antitrust has its own private right of action standing rules,161 as
well as an additional institutional feature that might significantly
limit some of the abuses associated with Lochnerizing. One pro-
posed route for increasing the preemptive scope of federal antitrust
law over anticompetitive state and local regulation is to hold the
159. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
160. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493-96 (2009) (holding that
Article III standing required that a plaintiff suffer specific and concrete injury due to
application of regulation).
161. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 529 (1983).
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Parker doctrine inapplicable to the FTC.162 This would give the FTC
enhanced power to challenge anticompetitive state and local
regulations. Not only would this limit the incidence of challenges to
state regulation (the FTC Act is not privately enforceable and only
the Commission can initiate an action under the Act),163 but it would
also put the Commission itself, rather than an Article III court, in
the position of making an initial decision on the case. An Article III
court could ultimately become involved, as adverse Commission
decisions are appealable to any federal court of appeal in which the
case could have been initially brought.164 However, lodging the
antitrust review function in the FTC would grant the Commission
an initial regulatory review function and the power to make factual
findings subject to “substantial evidence” review.165
Whether lodging an enhanced review function in the FTC as
opposed to private litigants would lessen concerns over Lochnerizing
depends in large part on what one perceives to be the central evil of
Lochner. Was Lochner problematic because judges usurped the
decisions rightfully committed to more democratically representa-
tive branches of government? Or was the problem that they were
ideologically committed to formalistic categories such as common
law baselines, the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements,
and an arbitrary distinction between government action and in-
action?166
The institutional concerns about judges substituting their own
economic preferences for those of legislators and members of the
executive branch might have less force in a context in which an
administrative agency—here the FTC—reviewed state and local
regulations for compatibility with federal antitrust law. Historically,
the political coalitions that opposed economic substantive due pro-
cess during the Progressive and New Deal eras were comfortable
with delegating extensive regulatory powers to federal adminis-
trative agencies167 and rejected Lochnerism because of the politi-
cal character of judicial activism by unelected judges even while
162. See supra text accompanying note 108.
163. E.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2012).
165. McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 826 (11th Cir. 2015).
166. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987).
167. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 47-88 (1938).
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supporting activism by theoretically more democratically account-
able institutions such as the FTC.168 Though ostensibly designed to
be technocratic and politically detached, the FTC is in fact polit-
ically responsive to the will of Congress, which holds its purse
strings.169 It is thus a more evidently “democratic” institution than
the courts are and has a legislative mandate from Congress to make
economic policy,170 which might lend legitimacy to its review of
anticompetitive state and local regulation.
Entrusting review to an agency rather than a court would not
entirely dissipate concerns about potential Lochnerizing; there
would remain judicial review of the agency decision in the federal
courts of appeal and, potentially, the Supreme Court.171 Still, ju-
dicial review of agency decisions is more restricted than direct
judicial review of state or local regulations. For example, agency
factual findings are upheld so long as supported by substantial
evidence, and the courts accord a degree of deference (albeit not
Chevron deference) to agency decisions on complex economic mat-
ters.172 While opportunities remain for the appellate courts to sub-
stitute their own judgment for that of state and local regulators,
they could only do so by siding with the FTC, because there would
be no judicial review in a case in which the Commission had decided
to uphold a regulation as consistent with federal law.173
As to the objection that Lochner represented a formalistic
classical ideology that entrenched antiredistributionist and laissez-
faire baselines, simply handing off the review function to the FTC
is not a complete answer to that concern. Enhancing the Commis-
sion’s preemptive powers over state and local regulations would
168. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement:
Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 723 (1991); see also Cass
R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 437 (1987)
(explaining the growth of the twentieth century administrative state as a reaction to Loch-
nerism). 
169. On the democratic accountability of the FTC, see Daniel A. Crane, Debunking
Humphrey’s Executor, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1835, 1852-53 (2015).
170. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46, 57a, 57b-3 (2012).
171. Appeals from FTC decisions may be lodged in any federal appellate court in whose
jurisdiction the action could have been commenced. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c).
172. Commission determinations of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its
determinations of law de novo. McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 827 (11th Cir. 2015).
173. Judicial review in an appellate court is only available to a defendant in an FTC
enforcement action against whom the Commission makes an adverse ruling. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c). 
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represent a shift toward deregulation, as the power could only be
wielded to strike down regulations—not to require more regulation
or to institute regulations of the Commission’s own making. In
ideological terms, state action immunity generally codes as a
progressive doctrine designed to insulate regulatory schemes from
challenge and, hence, many of the sharpest critiques of the Parker
immunity doctrine have been aligned with the antiregulatory Chi-
cago School174 and probusiness Republican administrations.175
At the same time, the FTC’s preemptive agenda would be unlikely
to focus on entrenching established economic interests and preserv-
ing the status quo in the distribution of property and income—the
second vision of what is wrong with Lochner. To the contrary, as
discussed earlier, the general tendency of anticompetitive state
regulations is to entrench economic incumbents and incumbent
technologies by denying entry to new firms and technologies.176 In
this context, enhanced antitrust preemption of state and local reg-
ulation would be a liberalizing force creating opportunities for new
market entry—just the opposite of a set of doctrines protecting the
status quo.
D. Interactions Between Constitutional and Antitrust Levers
The final category for comparing the constitutional and antitrust
tools as instruments for challenging anticompetitive state and local
174. Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: The Intractable Problem of
Antitrust Jurisdiction, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 1, 13 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004) (describing Parker
doctrine as enabling mutual exploitation of citizens by the states); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1983), as
reprinted in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT, supra, at 189, 208 (arguing for cost exter-
nalization modification to Parker immunity).
175. Melissa Lipman, A Brief History of the FTC’s State Action Battles, LAW360 (Feb. 26,
2015, 8:56 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/625576/a-brief-history-of-the-ftc-s-state-
action-battles [https://perma.cc/79FW-AP8G] (describing task force created in 2001 by
Republican FTC Chairman Tim Muris with mandate to study Parker immunity issues with
an eye to bringing more pro-competition cases); Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Remarks before the Fordham Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law
& Policy (Oct. 24, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ public_statements/
state-intervention/state-action-u.s.perspective/fordham031024.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW3S-
ER94] (outlining positive program of attacking state restraints on competition).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
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regulations concerns the potential interaction between the two doc-
trines. Procedurally and institutionally, the two theories would need
to run in parallel—they could not be brought simultaneously in the
same case. The FTC cannot bring constitutional challenges, and no
one other than the FTC can bring a case under Section 5 of the FTC
Act.177 Therefore, to speak about the two theories as either substi-
tutes or complements is not to imagine that they ever could be
asserted in the same case or by the same set of actors. Rather, it is
to observe that advocates of enhanced scrutiny of anticompetitive
state and local regulations have choices about how and where to
push for heightened review.
Someone strongly committed to a systematic challenge of anti-
competitive regulations might advocate for a simultaneous charge
on both fronts—reinvigorating equal protection, substantive due
process, and perhaps negative Commerce Clause review, even while
also curbing the Parker doctrine and empowering the FTC to un-
dertake more trenchant review. However, even if such an approach
were desirable in principle, there is reason to believe that it would
be politically, institutionally, and doctrinally challenging to ramp up
both tools at once. As is often the case when expanding potency of
legal doctrines or institutions runs into background concerns about
overreaching—here Lochner—courts and other agencies of govern-
ment have a tendency to justify timidity by observing that the
problem in question could be better addressed by another institution
or legal doctrine.178 Thus, presented with the possibility of re-
invigorating constitutional restraints on competitively parochial
regulations, the courts might demur on the grounds that, if there is
a serious problem, then it can be addressed by an administrative
institution such as the FTC, thereby avoiding the specter of Loch-
ner. Conversely, if urged to whittle down Parker immunity in an
FTC case, the reviewing courts might also demur, observing that
any sufficiently serious problem might be addressed under constitu-
tional principles.
Assuming that the political resources necessary to ramp up either
the antitrust or constitutional theory are scarce and that support for
177. See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that
no private right of action exists under the FTC Act).
178. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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the two theories is mutually competitive, the question arises of
whether it would be more effective to focus exclusively on one of the
two theories or instead attempt to create two differentiated tools
tailored to address different problems in different fields. Such a
move would require limiting the generality of each of the tools by
focusing on distinctive factors or patterns. For example, the con-
stitutional principle against anticompetitive parochialism could be
focused on failures of political processes—particularly circumstances
where costs are externalized outside the boundaries of the voting
jurisdiction.179 By contrast, the FTC’s heightened preemptive pow-
ers might be focused on circumstances involving restraints that
limit innovation.180 While there would obviously be some overlap
between these two categories and hence some contestable turf
(assuming, again, that the two theories are mutually competitive),
some effort at such a division of labor might assuage concerns about
a return to Lochnerism.
Finally, although the preceding analysis has assumed some
benefits to making a coordinated strategic decision about which
legal and policy levers to pull, such coordination may be infeasible
given that—apart from the courts—the communities involved in
forming antitrust and constitutional law and policy are almost
entirely distinct. The antitrust bar that stocks the FTC is special-
ized and relatively insular.181 Constitutional theories directed at
anticompetitive state and local regulations have been largely
pushed by public interest firms such as the Institute for Justice and
the Pacific Legal Foundation, which have shown little interest in
antitrust theories.182 So perhaps the possibility of coordinating the
179. See supra Part I.A. To the extent that anticompetitive regulations have the effect of
externalizing costs by discriminating against out-of-state residents, they are already uncon-
stitutional under the dormant commerce clause. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl.
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
180. See supra Part I.B.
181. See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160, 1163
(2008) (describing antitrust as a largely technical field managed by expert lawyers and
economists).
182. See Jarod M. Bona, The Antitrust Implications of Licensed Occupations Choosing Their
Own Exclusive Jurisdiction, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 28, 50 (2011) (reporting that
the Institute for Justice has sought declaratory and injunctive relief against occupational
licensing boards on constitutional, but not antitrust, grounds, even while the FTC pursued
similar theories on antitrust grounds).
2019] SCRUTINIZING ANTICOMPETITIVE STATE REGULATIONS 1213
deployment of the constitutional and antitrust theories is the sort
of question that would interest our hypothetical Platonic guardian,
but, like the rest of her hypothesized work, have little relevance to
the rest of us.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented the case for heightening judicial and/or
administrative scrutiny of state and local regulations that impair
competition for the benefit of favored producers and to the detri-
ment of consumers. Particularly in markets characterized by en-
trenched technological incumbents facing the threat of disruptive
technologies, a series of structural factors makes it far too easy for
the incumbents to hold off the new entrants through the force of
often outdated regulation.183
The important policy question is whether—in light of this nation’s
controversial, and now broadly maligned, experiment with economic
substantive due process during the Lochner era—the evils of such
anticompetitive regulations are simply the price of democracy, or
whether steps could be taken to heighten judicial or administrative
review without threatening a return to Lochnerism. This Article
has compared two potential tools—a constitutional antiparochial-
ism principle and heightened preemptive powers for the FTC. Both
could potentially be effective to address anticompetitive regula-
tions; both pose distinctive risks.
On balance, relaxing state action immunity in FTC cases and
thereby granting the Commission heightened preemptive powers
probably raises fewer concerns about Lochernizing than does a
broader promotion of the antiparochialism equal protection principle
recognized in a handful of appellate decisions. On the other hand,
granting the FTC expanded powers of this kind raises some other
political risks—particularly backlash from state and local govern-
ments leading to a loss of support for the Commission in Washing-
ton, D.C., or excessive entanglement with state and local politics.184
183. See supra Part I.
184. The FTC has historical experience with backlash against overreaching by the Com-
mission leading to a significant loss of political capital. See generally J. Howard Beales, III,
Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory Retrospective that Advises the Present, 12 GEO.
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Neither tool is free from significant costs and risks, but, given the
high costs to consumer welfare, innovation, and industrial freedom
posed by state and local parochialism, some risks may be worth
taking.
MASON L. REV. 873 (2004) (reflecting on FTC efforts to regulate advertising to children in the
late 1970s that led to widespread criticism of the Commission as a “national nanny”).
